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Richard Epstein's Big Picture
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Simple Rules for a Complex World. Richard A. Epstein. Harvard
University Press, 1995. Pp xiv, 361.

Some day someone may write a piece of narrative scholarship about the bureaucratic experience, called perhaps "The Voice
of Colorlessness." Such an article probably would discuss the
phenomenon of going big picture, whereby someone normally or
previously concerned with the intricate gearing of the great machine of state changes focus and tries to see the forest for the
trees. This transition often accompanies promotion and, for those
disposed to swell rather than grow, involves the sorry fate known
as going terminally big picture. There are a few, however, who
combine the ability actually to see the big picture, rather than a
projection from their swollen egos, and to return from the heights
and use what they have learned to make the gears work more
smoothly, or to propose a whole new machine. In Simple Rules
for a Complex World, Richard Epstein, a gear grinder and escarpment designer with the best of them, goes big picture with considerable success-especially given his ambition, which is to pro-

t Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. The reader should know that although I did not see this book in draft, Professor Epstein is a friend of mine. My recommendation is that this knowledge induce a proper skepticism rather than a decision to
give this review a pass.
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vide most of the content of a system of private law and the foundations of public law.
As a first attempt to locate Epstein's program in the great
scheme of things, let me propose a big picture of my own, one I
do not mean to be taken completely literally. The picture involves
lagged hundred-year waves of intellectual and practical influence,
with Adam Smith as the most influential economist of the nineteenth century and Karl Marx the most influential of the twentieth century. Epstein is pushing one of the two principal rivals for
that status as to the twenty-first century while also putting some
money on a dark horse. The rivals so far are Joseph Schumpeter
and Friedrich Hayek. Epstein is for Hayek, with a second vote for
Ronald Coase.
Schumpeter, to use comic-strip levels of generality, maintained that capitalism would be undone, and socialism established, because capitalism brings to power intellectuals who oppose it and prefer central control with themselves in the control
room.' Hayek maintained that having anyone in the control
room, indeed believing that there is a control room and acting on
that belief, leads to authoritarianism-authoritarianism with
good luck, totalitarianism otherwise.2 Coase improved the analysis for those interested in the institutional settings of economic
activity by showing the pervasive importance of barriers to transactions.'
Epstein is a Hayekian-cum-Coasean. To be sure, it is a little
misleading to set up the big picture as a struggle between
Schumpeter and Hayek, because they asserted different kinds of
propositions. Schumpeter made claims about the actual course of
history, claims that have been falsified in many respects. Hayek
made claims about the consequences of alternative sets of institutional arrangements, rather than predictions about what was
most likely to happen simpliciter. Nevertheless the opposition of
the two provides an insight worth the loss of analytical perfection: Epstein is carrying on Hayek's struggle against the tendency that Schumpeter said was a primary driver of history, that of
intellectuals to fear property and markets and favor public control of them.4

See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 145-55 (Harper
& Row 3d ed 1950).
2 See F.L Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 97-111 (Chicago 50th anniv ed 1994).
3 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 18 (1960).
See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy at 145-55 (cited in note 1).

1996]

Richard Epstein's Big Picture

This Review consists of an exposition of Epstein followed by
three sets of criticisms. The criticisms do not focus on the merits
of his libertarian proposals. My policy views are largely in accord
with his, so I lack comparative advantage on that subject. The
reader who is interested in more penetrating and illuminating
disagreements than I could provide can easily find scholarship
that engages Epstein on such terms. Instead, my questions and
disagreements have to do with the ideas of simplicity and complexity around which Epstein builds the book. Here I often take
issue with Epstein. Because I focus narrowly on the words "simplicity" and "complexity," one might think of my critique as a
worm's-eye view of the big picture.
One criticism, though, belongs up front: this book needs another draft. Epstein explains that it grew out of a series of lectures delivered on a tour of Australia and New Zealand, lectures
"often hastily composed" (p xiii). Grant Gilmore said that Corbin
On Contracts was the greatest law book ever written; Simple
Rules is the greatest law book ever written on a tray table.5 It is
rich in argument and insight, but the rapid drafting is still noticeable, especially in the order of exposition. Although Epstein is
trying to present a unifying theory of private law, he still seems
to take his topics from the first-year law school curriculum. With
another draft Epstein could have been more systematic and
hence more readily could have given the nonlawyer reader a deep
understanding of private law as something other than merely
what lawyers do.

I. THE BOOK
A. The Debate
This big picture business is risky. About thirty years ago a
brilliant legal scholar wrote a wonderful, influential, and famous

' See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 57 (Ohio State 1974). This problem is
hardly disabling. Tradition holds that Plato's Laws, as we have it, is a next-to-last draft,
and it is certainly worth reading. Moreover, just as a law can be either too simple or too
complex, so a book can be written too hastily or too slowly. Gilmore noted that
"Corbin-perhaps unwisely-had spent the better part of fifty years readying the treatise
for publication." Id. In this review I draw heavily on another book that was written too
slowly-indeed, was written infinitely slowly, as it is and always will remain unfinished.
Despite that, The Legal Process is my current selection for Greatest Law Book Ever
Written, Unmodified Category. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Foundation 1994) (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds).
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article that was also a lightning rod for divine vengeance. Its
conclusion begins as follows:
The highly organized, scientifically planned society of the
future, governed for the good of its inhabitants, promises the
best life that men have ever known. In place of the misery
and injustice of the past there can be prosperity, leisure,
knowledge, and rich opportunity open to all.6
That small piece of fused glass amid the wreckage of central
planning was once part of a neon sign that read, "The New Property." Central ownership of the means of production is very much
out of fashion and, I think, likely to remain so for a long time.
The closer "scientific planning" comes to public ownership, the
more it is criticized.
Part of the neon sign took the lightning, but not all. The
debate between central control and the decentralized market, or
if you prefer between government and private power, goes on. As
Epstein discusses, the choice now is not how much of the economy the government should own in the standard socialist sense.
The question is the extent to which government should direct the
uses of largely private property and the content of largely private
contracts, and how far it should use tax funds to supply goods,
services, or income (see pp 15-16, 22-23). In short, should there
be a regulatory welfare state?
No, says Epstein, for essentially Hayekian reasons. Individuals have information about opportunities and, given private ownership of the means of production, incentives to produce the
goods and services other people want. Government bureaus have
neither the necessary information nor the correct incentives, and
no one yet knows a way to give them either (pp 42-48). According
to Epstein, that is true whether the question is state ownership
and distribution, or state regulation and redistribution (pp 1416). Simple Rules for a Complex World presents a view of the big
picture and makes broad claims about it. Whether it is safe to
stand near Epstein during thunderstorms the reader can judge.
B. The Genre
Life imitates art, or should when life involves reviewing a
law book. Arthur Leff began his classic review of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law by asking what genre the work fell into,

' Charles A. Reich, The New Propery, 73 Yale L J 733, 786 (1964).
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and eventually concluded that it was a picaresque novel.7 Although Epstein's book jumps around enough that it sometimes
seems to be the equivalent in legal scholarship of John Cage's
aleatoric music, I finally concluded that Simple Rules for a Complex World is a myth. Let me hasten to say that this is not a bad
thing. A myth, in the sense I am using the concept, is a story, a
way of thinking about and organizing a subject matter. Every
detail may not be there, and some that are there may not be
quite right, but the real point is to provide a way of identifying
and understanding the crucial premises and questions. The book
is also, to use a more technical idea, much like a philosophical
explanation in Nozick's sense: it tells us how it could be true that
libertarianism is desirable.8
This kind of work is extremely valuable for people who are
trying to make up their minds about the issues it discusses. But
a myth, or philosophical explanation, or big picture, is not a treatise. Simple Rules for a Complex World is not a systematic analysis of law, economics, political science, or normative political
theory. It seeks not to persuade the skeptic that Epstein's politics
are desirable, but to enable the more open-minded reader to come
to grips with the fundamental questions. One important consequence of this is that the book is not primarily aimed at specialists in any of the fields mentioned above. In particular, it is not
primarily aimed at academic specialists in the fields of law that
Epstein addresses. They will find in the footnotes references to
the details of debates with which they are familiar, debates to
which Epstein has contributed in his periods as a gear polisher.
A myth should not be judged by the standards appropriate to a
treatise; one should not criticize a picaresque novel because it
does not rhyme.
This does not mean that we can simply let Epstein off the
hook for any failings by saying that the book belongs to a genre
with forgiving standards. In many important respects the standards are the same. Although a book like this will not have the
same level of detail and extent of proof that a different kind of
work would have, it still makes substantive claims that should be
engaged at the appropriate, here relatively high, level of generality. Moreover, in some ways the standards for a good political

' Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
Va L Rev 451, 451-52 (1974), reviewing Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(Little, Brown 1973).
' See Robert Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanations 8-18 (Belknap 1981).
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myth are more exacting than those for a work of standard legal
scholarship. The reader of a myth cannot be expected to do as
much work as the specialist reading a treatise, so the demands of
clarity and organization are even higher. On this score, the fact
that this book is unfinished is especially problematic.
C. The Message
Later in this Review I will attribute Gallicism to Epstein, so
perhaps it is no accident that the book is divided into three parts,
plus an introduction and a conclusion. The introduction argues
broadly that this country is overgoverned and, in particular,
overlawyered. Part I makes the general case for legal simplicity
and attempts to account for the growth of legal complexity, both
as defined by Epstein. Part II sets out the fundamentals of
Epstein's private law and his master principle of public law;
these are the simple rules. Part III argues that the Epsteinian
common law is equal to the legal challenges of our complex world
and contrasts the common law favorably with more intrusive
regulatory systems in a variety of areas, such as employment
law, products liability, and environmental protection. The conclusion responds to some of the more common challenges to
Epstein's approach.
1. Simplicity and its enemies.
Epstein begins this program with a discussion of overall
strategy. He distinguishes simple rules from complex ones. Then
a central passage sets out what he regards as one of the fundamental and recurring choices faced by the legal and institutional
designer: the "great trade-off.., between social incentives and
administrative costs" (p 30). The point of law is to affect people's
incentives and thereby shape their conduct. But running Leviathan is costly and government makes mistakes. The goal of the
system designer thus is to maximize the net benefit of law.9 One
of the great mistakes, and a great enemy of simplicity, is to neglect the administrative costs of government and to focus only on
the benefits it can achieve by changing people's incentives.

' Epstein says that "the social function of law is to minimize the sum of the administrative (including error) costs and the costs associated with the creation of poor incentives
for individual action" (pp 32-33), citing Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal
and Economic Analysis 26-28 (Yale 1970), the famous book in which Judge (then-Professor) Calabresi suggests that the purpose of tort law is to minimize the combined costs of
accidents, the prevention of accidents, and the administration of the system.
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Another standard mistake that leads to more complexity is to
see political organizations, not pessimistically as great robber
bands, but optimistically as large versions of the small and (generally) benign groups we encounter in ordinary life, such as families and circles of friends (pp 44-48). Such small groups, says
Epstein, often function well by following informal and complicated norms, the very approach he says is dangerous or impossible
for large groups of strangers. But small groups are crucially different from polities made up of strangers. In small groups, especially families, people generally have interdependent utility functions, which is to say that they care about one another a lot, and
therefore treat one another's good and ill as their own. Moreover,
in such groups people tend to know one another well and so have
the detailed and idiosyncratic information that enables them to
act as proxies for one another. In the wider world, however, interests diverge and information is not available, so "legal sanctions cannot hope to perform at the same level of specificity and
reliability achieved by informal sanctions in small groups" (p 46).
Rather, Epstein says that the strategy of law and public force
should be to enable people to sort themselves into small groups
while dealing with strangers at arm's length.
2. The simple rules.
a. The simple rules analyzed. Epstein says that there are
six or seven simple rules, depending on when he is counting. The
basic six are "self-ownership, or autonomy; first possession; voluntary exchange; protection against aggression; limited privilege
for cases of necessity; and takings of property for public use on
payment of just compensation" (p 53). The seventh rule is that if
there is to be redistribution to the poor it must be financed by
flat taxes (p 148). In this part of the Review I will attempt to restate the substance of Epstein's system in what seems to me an
analytically sharper form. I do this both in the interest of clarity
and because Epstein's program is to produce a system of private
law, along with a basic principle of public law. A structure of
such breadth and depth should be cast in some canonical form.
The form I will use for the private-law components (rules one
through five) is that suggested by Hart and Sacks in their development of Hohfeld, a framework in which they identify private
law as a system of rules for conduct and rules for changing rules
for conduct."0 This structure accommodates Epstein's simple
"0 Hart and Sacks focus on one of the four components from each of Hobfeld's famous

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:837

rules because, despite his constant reliance on economics, Epstein
is enough of a legal formalist to use the concept of legal prohibitions and permissions. He regularly talks about what the law
forbids and what it requires. Presumably the rules have sanctions attached to them that encourage compliance, but Epstein
says very little about the sanctions, which turn commands into
incentives. This approach is formalistic in that it takes legal
concepts and categories seriously, rather than adopting the
stance of the Holmesian "bad man."" The bad man sees the law
not as a set of rules but as a list of prices: he collapses substance
and sanction and sees, not "murder is forbidden," but rather "if
you commit the following kinds of homicide the state will attempt
to do the following to you in return" (the sanction, discounted by
the likelihood of application, is the price of murder). Epstein, in
contrast, says much about rights and duties but little about sanctions.
Rules about duties and powers tell people what they may
and may not do, and what they may do if they have the appropriate person's permission. If the system of duties is completed by
the principle that everything that is not forbidden is permitted,
then the rules about duties and powers should pretty much tell
who prevails when desires conflict. If the rules imply that A may
enter Blackacre only with B's permission, then A has to buy the
right to do so from B. A set of duties and powers thus gives the
initial endowments from which bargaining can take place, the
initial assignment of rights that, per the Coase Theorem, would
be irrelevant as to allocation if there were no transaction costs.'
The rules therefore give the baseline for A and B whenever A
and B are in a "Coasean nexus." Properly designed systems of
duties and powers will tell modern lawyer-economists what they
most need to know.

two boxes of juridical relations: duties from the first box and powers from the second box.
The focus on duties rather than rights means that law is formulated as addressed to
potential actors, rather than nonactors (which are what rights-bearers tend to be). The
focus on powers, especially the law concerning the power to make contracts, similarly
emphasizes potential actors, those who are considering changing their legal relations and
those of their contracting partners. Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 127-37 (cited in
note 5). Hohfeld first presented his scheme in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L J 710, 710 (1917).
Hohfeld's first box contains rights, duties, no-rights, and privileges. His second box contains powers, liabilities, disabilities, and immunities. Id.
" See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897).
12 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 3).
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It should now be possible to cast Epstein's simple rules into
a somewhat clearer form. The private-law rules fall into three
categories: property, contract, and unintentional physical injury." Property and contract, the master categories, each contain
basic principles and modifications.
The fundamental law of property is:
(1)

most physical objects, including people's bodies, have
owners;' 4

(2)

it is forbidden to touch or otherwise physically interfere with a piece of property without the owner's
permission (pp 91-92);

(3)

people own their own bodies (pp 54-59); and

(4)

ownership of other objects, including real estate, is
determined by first possession and subsequent exchange pursuant to the other simple rules (pp 59-63),
or by current possession if it is hopeless to untangle
a series of wrongful acquisitions (pp 63-67).

These rules generate duties and powers; what is normally called
the owner's right to use (subject to the duty imposed by others'
ownership of their property) results from the principle that what
is not forbidden is permitted.
Keep your hands to yourself. Keep off. Good fences make
good neighbors.
There are three significant modifications of the fundamental
law of property. First, there should be some common property,
which a large number of people are all permitted to use to an
equal but limited extent (pp 67-70). Rivers, for example, should
be treated this way. Second, there should be some "new property," like copyright and reputation (pp 327-31). New-property rules
consist of prohibitions on actions where the actions are not physical trespasses; examples of actions forbidden by new-property
rules include reproducing works of literature and telling lies
about other people. The prohibitions are usually combined with a
power in an "owner" to waive the prohibition, especially for a fee.
New-property regimes should be set up when they will encourage

"

14

For reasons explained below, it is misleading to call the last category "tort."
This is implicit in the discussion of autonomy and first possession (pp 54-63).
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production or rectify market failures without making people
worse off net of the new duty and the benefits it produces. Finally, when life or property is in severe danger and can be saved by
violating the rules of trespass, those rules are waived and replaced with an obligation to pay a market price for any property
taken (pp 113-16).
The rule on contracts is simple: people who have capacity to
contract may make whatever contracts they like (pp 71-78). Almost all adults have contractual capacity. Contracts made under
threat of a violation of the property rules are void (pp 80-82). The
modification is that agreements to form a horizontal cartel are
void (p 125).
Most of what Epstein puts in the tort box under the label
"protection against aggression" I have moved to the property box.
The rule against physical trespass seems to me inseparable from
the law of property, because it tells us what it means to own
something: it means that you are permitted to touch it, and no
one else is unless you consent. That is not to say, however, that
there is nothing distinctive in what is normally called the law of
tort. Because the law of property and contract consists of rules
for voluntary action, it cannot deal conveniently with the inadvertent consequences of action. As Epstein says in his discussion
of tort, it is clear that there should be liability for intentional
trespasses (p 92). He devotes considerable discussion, however, to
the argument that strict liability is preferable to a negligence
rule for unintentional damage to property, which seems to me to
be a separate question. Epstein's other great principle of tort is a
negative one: harms caused by economic competition should not
be legally remediable, nor should be those harms that result
when one person gives offense to another without a trespass, as
for example by subscribing to a despised religion (or a despised
periodical) (pp 107, 109-10). In general, with the few exceptions
of new property, only physical trespass should be actionable.
Thus the private law, resulting from the first five simple
rules. The sixth simple rule applies to the government. It is
Epstein's takings proviso. The master principle is that the
government's action, measured against the baseline created by
the private law rules, must not "impose an implicit transfer of
wealth from one individual or group to another" (p 135).
Epstein's takings principle applies whenever the government,
without changing the rules of private law, takes something from
someone, whether it be through eminent domain (p 129), taxation
(pp 137-40), or otherwise. The principle also applies whenever
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the government changes the rules of private law with an unfavorable effect on anyone (pp 132-37). An example of such a
change would be a law providing that it would not be trespass,
theft, or otherwise unlawful to carry off alcoholic beverages previously in someone else's possession.15 Epstein says that whenever
the government does either of these-that is, takes something
from someone without changing the rules of private law or
changes the private law to someone's detriment-it must provide
just compensation. Compensation can be either in cash or in
kind, and justice requires that the compensation be worth the
same as what is lost. The creation of any regime of new property
must also satisfy this constraint (p 328). The government may
impose copyright restrictions, which forbid actions such as duplicating someone else's original writing, only if everyone's own
ability to produce copyrighted material, combined with the benefit of increased production by others, is worth more than the loss
of one's former license to jot down Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
Are Dead and sell it. No government redistribution.
Well, maybe some government redistribution, if people really
insist, but only if it is financed by flat taxes (pp 144-48). That is
the seventh rule, if it is to be counted. 6
b. The simple rulesjustified. Why would anyone want to
live in Epstein-land? According to Epstein, the simple rules go a
long way toward solving the problems inherent in human social
life. When he puts on his legal-architect hat Epstein is a roughand-ready utilitarian. He is trying to help people satisfy their
desires and as far as he is concerned one desire is as good as
another and one person is as good as the next. But there are a lot
of people in the world, and sometimes their desires conflict. As if
that were not bad enough, even when their desires are in harmony and they indeed want to work together, working together can
be tricky to organize. Thus, says Epstein, "[tihe central problems
of the legal system are two: how to keep people at peace with
each other; and how to allow them to join together in common
ventures that promise mutual gain" (p 327).

"

Wynehamer v People, 13 NY 378 (1856).

16 Sometimes Epstein says there are six rules, other times he says there are seven

(compare, for example, p 53 with p 148). Moreover, he maintains that the takings constraint limits the government to flat taxes anyway (pp 137-40), so it is not clear why there
need be a seventh rule.
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Epstein's tools are as familiar-and as rough and ready-as
his normative goal. He adopts an account of human psychology
known to any student of the line of thought that stretches from
Hobbes, through Locke, Hume, and Smith, down to present-day
rational-choice economics: people are largely self-interested (p
22). They are especially interested in physical security and comfort, but they also have benevolent feelings toward others, the
strength of which decreases with distance (pp 42-44). Information
is expensive to acquire and often difficult to communicate. No
surprises here; Epstein adopts one variant of the economic approach.
His basic practical criterion will not surprise anyone familiar
with that approach, although its casual formulation will disturb
those who have momentarily forgotten that this book is a myth,
not a treatise. The criterion is crude Paretianism, based on
Epstein's horseback empirical judgments about people's interests
and the consequences of institutional arrangements. He proposes
rules that he says will make everyone better off (pp 30, 34). To
the extent that he is silently appealing to standard concepts of
welfare economics, he apparently means not merely that the
rules will generate net benefits, so that the winners could com7
pensate the losers, but that they will make everyone better off."
Epstein's rules begin with ownership, of oneself and of external things. If I understand Epstein, he has both an argument for
private property in general, which justifies the institution with
respect to people's bodies as well as other things, and an argument specifically for autonomy (self-ownership).

" I think it is crude Paretianism, but it may be crude utilitarianism or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. Epstein's position is hard to pin down. In particular, I am not sure about the
extent to which he means to be comparing utilities when he discusses net improvements
in social welfare. Epstein says that the move from anarchy to the simple rules makes
everyone better off (pp 32-34), and that modifications in the simple rules, like copyright,
are permissible if they make everyone better off (pp 328-31). Strict application of the
Pareto principle would take the idea of making everyone better off seriously: if any
individual would object to the change (for nonstrategic reasons), then it does not satisfy
the Pareto criterion. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or simple utilitarianism, is more lenient.
The trouble is that Epstein slides from talking about making everyone better off to
talking about improving social welfare, without saying much about the difference. Moreover, he invokes a veil of ignorance that is not well defined and hence might correspond
either to the Pareto criterion or to something like utilitarianism (see, for example, pp 5758, 313-15).
18 By putting the arguments this way I have rearranged Epstein's order of exposition.
He begins his account of self-ownership by comparing it to other systems of ownership of
people, especially slavery and a Rawls-inspired system in which everyone owns a share in
everyone else (pp 54-59). See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-42 (Belknap 1971). He
then turns to land and chattels, arguing in favor of first possession as a general matter
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The main argument for common law ownership-the ban on
physical trespass unless the single owner consents-applies to
people as well as to land and chattels. Much of what people care
about, and are likely to have conflicts over, involves the physical
use of things. People who are guaranteed control and enjoyment
of things will work hard to improve them and use them productively. So ownership is good. If a lot of people have to agree on
the use of a thing and will share in the rewards of that use, the
high costs of coordination (including free-rider problems) will severely retard any productive activity. Single-owner private ownership thus is especially good. Incentives, information, and costs
of administration are the keys. It is Hayek plus Coase. 9
The next step is to explain the particular allocation of private property. As to people themselves, the claim is that people
care especially about what happens to them, so they especially
value control over themselves. Because the entire system is about
achieving people's goals, this allocation of rights does the best job
of matching power and responsibility. As to land and chattels,
the argument for first possession is that its administrative costs
are low. It avoids the need for a central authority to parcel out
property while still giving strong incentives to develop resources.
Later in the book Epstein makes another, more traditionally
Hobbesian argument for self-ownership. It goes like this: people
really dislike having other people physically molest them or
threaten to do so. To be sure, it can be useful to be able to assault other people or threaten to do so, but on balance the ability
to do that would be worth trading for protection against aggression directed at you. People are made better off by the Hobbesian

(pp 59-63). Only later does he discuss the relative merits of private and common property
in nonhuman assets (pp 67-70). It seems to me, though, that the proper order is as follows: whether to have ownership, whether to have private or collective ownership (or
something else), and then who should start out owning what. The answer to the first
question underlies his discussion of property but is most clearly presented later when he
turns to torts and argues that people would not want to live in a world in which others
could routinely block their uses of property (p 91). This is not really about remedies but
about rights, and is in fact an argument in favor of having legal rules that say who can
use what-rules of property. To say that others may not trespass on your land is to tell
what it means to say that the land is yours; the right of property is defined by the correlative duty not to trespass. Epstein's argument against the Rawls-like approach is the case
for private property applied specifically to people; his discussion of common property is
the case applied to other assets. The argument against slavery is an argument in favor of
self-ownership, assuming there is going to be private property in people. It seems logically
parallel to the argument for first possession with respect to things.
" See, for example, R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L &
Econ 1, 14 (1959).
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nonaggression pact, says Epstein (pp 91-92). To say that people
are not allowed to engage in trespass to other people's bodies,
however, is to say through the back door that people own themselves.
The allocation of private property, then, is oneself and whatever one can get without violating anyone else's physical autonomy. The latter rule is first possession. As for the distributional
consequences of first possession (some people don't arrive first at
anything), Epstein is not concerned with them because of his
empirical estimate of the productivity of such a system:
Those who are unable to acquire goods by first possession
are able to acquire them by purchase financed by money,
goods, or land that they acquire from the use of their own
labor. Since two individuals can make gainful exchanges
without the participation of the rest of the world, the overall
size of the gain is so large that we need not trouble ourselves over its distribution (p 62).
Take that, welfare state.
Okay now, everyone who owns something obtained by first
possession, or who is in a chain of title that can be traced back to
someone who owned the thing by first possession, raise your
hand. As Epstein recognizes, "in a world filled with private violence and political corruption, it often happens that the great
chain of title is broken beyond recognition" (p 63). His answers
are title by adverse possession or prescription, and relative title.
Statutes of limitations, relative title, and other such devices
have two benefits: they protect valid claims from false challenges
and they create a single owner needed to bring property back
into the stream of commerce (pp 64-67). If it seems that the incentives to produce that arise from single ownership are doing a
lot of work in Epstein's system, they are: such incentives, and the
production they encourage, are fundamental to all of Epstein's
claims, the empirical heart of his approach.
If Epstein's theory has a central theme, it emerges most
clearly here. Production is more important than distribution.
People should stop agonizing about the justice of current holdings
and get on with producing more for everyone. The central empirical claim is that the simple rules will encourage people to produce much more than would any other system, and that the benefits of that production will redound widely indeed.
Thus property, Epstein's first master principle. Next is free
contract, by which people give up what they have for something
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they want more. Variety of tastes and holdings makes it possible
that there will be gains from trade. Here is the motor of the
world, and the last thing Richard Epstein wants to be is the man
who stops it. Indeed, as Epstein recognizes, exchange is part of
the justification for the rules of autonomy and private property: if
people have secure control over things, they will use the things in
mutually advantageous transactions with others (pp 71-73). Epstein makes the case-clearly and powerfully-for a very general
principle of free contract, provided that the transaction is not
vitiated by physical force or fraud.
In doing so he explicitly sweeps away contracting parties'
particularities and situatedness. He makes rules, not for people
in all their idiosyncracies, but for "two hardy standbys in all
contractual arrangements: A and B" (p 73). He ignores role and
status, paying no attention to the fact that A is an impoverished
individual while B is a huge industrial combine. Epstein maintains that this mighty abstraction is justified because the law of
contract is all about a profound and thoroughly abstract truth:
what all those wildly different As and Bs have in common is that
they want more (p 75). If you want more there are two ways to
get it: coercion or consent, taking what you want from someone
else or trading something you have for something someone else
has. Consensual transactions generate gains from trade, making
both sides better off.
Epstein's rejection of some standard attacks on free contract
gives an insight into the core of his justification of the rule. In
opposing the concept of exploitation, he argues that what matters
between employer and employee is not power in some sociological
or psychological sense, but market power (pp 82-86). If one party
to a transaction where there are gains from trade has a strong
threat position, that party is likely to be able to extract most of
the surplus." In the vast bulk of labor contracts, he maintains,
both parties have numerous alternatives; labor markets are competitive on both sides (pp 83-84). In such circumstances workers
are not being exploited, they are being paid the market wage.2 1

' One's threat position is defined by one's best alternative to the transaction, including standing pat and making another bargain with another party (p 77).
2 Epstein, in keeping with much of the current debate on labor contracts, distin-

guishes the situation between employer and employee before the contract is entered into
from the situations that can obtain afterwards, which may include opportunities for
strategic behavior (pp 86-87). A worker who has invested heavily in firm-specific skills, to
take the standard example, now faces an employer with some monopsony power because
there is no perfect substitute for that employer. ven in such situations, though, Epstein
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Epstein makes it quite clear that competition is the healthiest situation. Indeed, many of the problems for which he must
modify the rules arise from monopoly, unilateral or bilateral.2 2
Moreover, he claims that one of the great strengths of his system
is that it maximizes the possibilities for entry into markets, in
part by minimizing the power of the great monopoly maker, the
government (p 78). And when situations of bilateral monopoly
cause him to change the rules from absolute ownership to takeand-pay, the proper measure of compensation is the free market
price (p 114).
It is not surprising, then, that the main modification of the
rule of free contract has to do with monopoly. He maintains that
horizontal covenants not to compete should be unenforceable (p
125). Once again, the idea is Coasean and the analysis familiar.
But for transactional barriers, including the coordination difficulties created by collective action problems, the customers of a
cartel would bribe the cartelists to produce at the competitile
level. The ban on price fixing thus produces the allocational result that would obtain absent transaction costs, with some
distributional consequences in favor of consumers. Because of his
pervasive fear of the state, however, Epstein will go no further." Price fixing is not to be a crime and merger to monopoly
is not to be forbidden (pp 125-26). Administrative costs and the
possibility of government misbehavior are too high.
Property and contract are the essence of the system. The
first-year law student's private law trivium also includes torts.
Much of what Epstein says on that subject I have moved into
property, on the theory that the ban on physical invasion is part

continues to prefer employment at will.
Accidental joint ownership, for example, creates difficulties because it involves a
bilateral monopoly (pp 116-18), as does divorce (pp 118-19).
' In a world with transaction costs, nonenforceability of cartel agreements, which
infringes freedom of contract, has distributional consequences that differ from those in a
regime of completely free contract. Moving from completely free contract to the common
law rule against horizontal restraints therefore would not make everyone better off unless
all potential cartel members would gain more from the ban than they lose.
Epstein's response to this criticism might be that at this point we are discussing the
initial design of the system, not an alteration to be made once it is operational. Potential
cartel members therefore are not losing their power to fix prices because they do not have
it yet; at this point, we are deciding whether they should have such a power and the
answer is no because of its allocative consequences. This response, however, exposes one
of the fundamental difficulties with his approach. Epstein has no criterion by which to
choose among different legal systems, each of which is better for everyone than anarchy
but that produce different distributions. This is what happens when one tries to rewrite
the social contract on an airline cocktail napkin.
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of the essence of property. Two great issues remain: first, the
choice between strict liability and negligence for unintentional
physical invasions; and second, the general principle that, with a
few exceptions, only physical harms count.24
Strict liability and Richard Epstein go way back. Although
his rationale has changed, the bottom line has not. In a perfect
world both strict liability and negligence would produce the same
conduct, because both would lead to the optimal level of precautions. The only difference would be distributional. Invoking the
rules' different administrative costs, Epstein opts for the approach that is easier to administer because it does not require inquiry into the reasonableness of precautions (pp 92-97).
More interesting (at least to a law professor who has had it
up to here with the foregoing debate) is his reason for limiting
the scope of compensable harms (pp 109-11). This negative principle is a central part of the system; the world is full of Coasean
nexi. Every time Lewd wants to read a dirty book, the reading of
which offends Prude, there is a conflict between two possible
activities, both of which cannot go forward: Lewd's reading and
Prude's peace of mind are incompatible. Every time a competitor
causes a business to lose revenue there is another conflict: the
competitor's business and the earlier revenue levels of the other
business are incompatible.
To those who suffer these very real harms that are nevertheless neither physical invasions nor within the limited scope of
permissible new property, Epstein's response is, suck it up. Get
over it and get on with your life. There are winners and losers in
these games but overall there is no reason to believe that people
are worse off on net as a result of economic competition or free
choice of lifestyle. If anything, the correct empirical answer is the
opposite: people would give up such restrictions on others in
order to be free themselves. "Unlike the harm ensuing from the
use of force and fraud, the private loss in these contexts is not a
reliable proxy for any form of social loss" (p 110). Let the good
times roll.
Well, let them roll as long as only individuals and voluntary
groups are invited to the party. Leviathan is too big and dangerous to be allowed to have any fun. The possibility of government

24 In strictness this point does not belong in the torts box either, because the duty-imposing rules of conduct that establish correlative rights go into property, at least in my
schema. It seems harmless to follow Epstein here, however, because it does not really
matter where a nonrule goes.
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misbehavior dominates the sixth and seventh rules. The takings
principle is Epstein's public law (pp 128-40). It controls public
finance, requiring that each individual's tax contribution be at
least balanced by benefits conferred through the provision of
public goods. It controls changes in the private law, requiring
that all the losers from any such change be at least compensated
by benefits they receive from it. No redistribution. (And if there
just has to be some redistribution through welfare programs let it
be financed by flat taxes.)
Epstein's approach to public law suggests that he is one of
those individuals who love people but cannot stand mankind. As
individuals and in voluntary groups people are industrious, tolerably honest, and reasonably caring. But bring them together to
form a government and the temptation to exploit the power that
comes with it is overwhelming. Government, like theft, presents
the opportunity to get something without having to pay for it.
Transactions that rest on government power, says Epstein, will
share the tendency of theft and slavery to be socially inefficient-people will take things that they value less than do the
people from whom they are taken (p 131). Moreover, even when
redistribution through government is a zero-sum or slightly positive-sum game, it consumes resources that could better be devoted to more reliably productive activities. Epstein's confidence in
the productive capacity of ownership and exchange combines with
his terror of rent-seeking to produce very limited government
indeed.
3. Resisting temptation.
That's all there is to the rules. In the third section of Simple
Rules, Epstein surveys a series of legal subjects, each time rejecting intrusive regulatory efforts in favor of the bare bones common law or some slight modification of it. He touches on labor
and employment discrimination, professional liability for financial loss, products liability, corporate capacity and governance,
and environmental protection. Much of this recapitulates his
earlier scholarship; the case for repealing the private-sector employment discrimination laws, for example, has a whole book,
Forbidden Grounds.25 These chapters contain a wealth of argument and instruction, but the diversity of subject matter makes

' Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard 1992).
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it uneconomical for a reviewer to say much about them. I will
therefore adopt the simple rule of saying nothing more.
4. Epstein on the spine edge.
Ever wondered what the opposite of cutting edge is? On a
one-edged knife the side that doesn't cut is called the spine, so it
should be spine edge. In the conclusion Epstein takes on a number of cutting-edge arguments against his position. To my mind
this is Epstein at his best, the autocrat of the Chicago lunch
table, responding to big-picture objections with penetrating insights into the underlying problems.26 He deals with exogenous
preferences, legitimate and illegitimate preferences, the extent to
which the simple rules capture justice and fairness, communitarianism, virtue, and the need for change in the simple rules.
In characterizing Epstein as the enemy of the intellectually
trendy I do not mean to suggest that he is a friend of entrenched
power. Certainly he denies that, explaining in his conclusion that
"[t]he protection of the rich because they are rich, or of vested interests because they are powerful, is no part of the overall plan"
(p 307). Moreover, Epstein is hardly altogether untrendy himself.
He has climbed aboard at least one contemporary bandwagon. As
he explains, the criticism of his position based on endogenous
desires maintains that preferences need not be respected in the
design of legal institutions because they are themselves the product of such institutions. Epstein's response is sociobiology. He
claims that Hobbes and his law-and-economics successors are
justified in assuming preferences to be relatively fixed and stable
because people's wants are largely hard wired, the product of
selection pressures back on the primitive savannah where ancestral humans developed (pp 310-11). When great questions of
policy depend on difficult and controversial empirical questions
Richard Epstein is not shy.
Proper evaluation of sociobiology awaits improved knowledge
of the genetic and neural mechanisms that it postulates but that
are so far largely unidentified. Less speculative is another response Epstein gives to those who would found extensive state
power on the theory that people do not really know their own

6 At least, I think Epstein's insights are penetrating, but then I largely agree with

them. As to lunch, he explains in the preface that the book rests on his "sense of the field"
in the various areas he covers, a sense "acquired over twenty-five years of teaching and
through innumerable meetings, conferences, workshops, classes, and, above all, lunches
with colleagues and friends" (p xi). Whether any of the lunches were free is left unclear.
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preferences or that some preferences are not to be respected: who
decides? Do you really want to live in a state "where some individuals are authorized to say that others know so little about
their own unstable preferences, and hence about their own
'permanent' or 'true' interests, that their own choices for leading
their own lives should not be respected at all" (p 312)? Do not
build the social control room unless you are very, very sure that
you will have a seat in it.
Epstein's response to communitarianism engages a very
common argument against individualism: individuals are the
products of society, and people succeed because their talents are
adapted to socially constructed standards (pp 320-22). Individuals
therefore cannot really take credit for their talents or the value
of those talents. The talents and the value instead belong to
society at large.
The response, if I read Epstein right, is that he has never
met this society-at-large person. He explains that no one believes
that "individuals arise Athena-like as full-blown members of
society, independent of all influences from other individuals who
live in society" (p 321). Moreover, he agrees that luck and caprice
affect people's talents and the preferences that determine the
value of those talents. But, according to Epstein, "this is an insight without a payoff.... Things could have been different, and
those who are successful today may well have been unsuccessful
instead, or at least less successful in a different environment. So
what of it?" (id). People's talents are not the work of "society" and
do not belong to "society" because "[it is not 'society' as some
abstract entity that values those talents," but real, concrete individuals (p 322). Those individuals get something in return; they
are not left net creditors. We do not owe ourselves to one another
because the books balance, and we do not owe ourselves to society because society is the sum of individuals. Epstein dissolves
the claims of community into the claims of people. The simple
rules are designed to deal with the claims of people who are not
in close, voluntary association with one another, and to leave
those close, voluntary associations alone.
II. SIMPLE RULES, COMPLEX RULES, BAD RULES,
AND Fuzzy RULES
Here is the first small-picture argument over a single concept: simplicity. Epstein's account of this concept is problematic.
As a result, he seriously overemphasizes the importance of simplicity, as more naturally understood, for his enterprise. More-
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over, again because of troubles with the conceptualization of
simplicity, he misses an important way in which his message
really is about simplicity. The book might be better titled Minimal Government for a Complex World with a chapter called "Why
Regulation Tends to Be Complex."
A. What's Simplicity Got to Do With It?
Meeting for lunch five minutes before noon at the north door
is a simple rule. Meeting for lunch at one of four different times
and three different places depending on the day of the week, the
phase of the moon, the current level of sunspot activity as reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
whether the coffee machine is working is a complex rule. Complex rules have higher administrative costs than simple ones: one
must expend more time and trouble in determining what the
complex rule requires and whether or not one is in compliance
with it. Administrative costs may be even greater if both a private person and someone in the government have to determine
whether the private person is in compliance. Furthermore, given
the limits of human computational abilities, and the likelihood
that any particular judgment will be wrong, people are more
likely to make mistakes the more judgments and computations
they must make. Error costs are a form of administrative costs
and rise with complication. This seems like an intuitively sound
understanding of complexity and simplicity in rules.
On some pages this appears to be Epstein's understanding.
He says that there is a "great trade-off... between social incentives and administrative costs" (p 30) whenever a sound legal
system aims to "minimize the sum of administrative (including
error) costs and the costs associated with the creation of poor
incentives for individual action" (p 32). The trade-off must be
made because sometimes that last bit of improvement is just not
worth the trouble. Einstein's equations of general relativity are
more accurate than Newton's gravitational equations, but their
complexity makes them harder to solve, so solving them takes
longer and is more likely to result in an error. Most of the time
the gain in accuracy from general relativity is vanishingly small,
so most of the time the additional accuracy is not worth the cost.
If one calculates correctly, though, the additional accuracy really
is there: Einstein's equations are closer to reality than Newton's.
Similarly, human traffic cops can usually control traffic better
than a signal, because they have much more inforr.ation and
greater computational ability than a light. But administering the
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complex rules used by human intelligence takes one of those
carbon-based general-purpose computers, and they can cost more
than traffic lights. The additional accuracy in traffic direction,
the improved incentives, are usually not worth the additional
administrative cost.
Epstein identifies four situations that can arise when balancing incentives and administrative costs:
(1)

superior incentives can be created at the price of increased administrative costs;

(2)

regulation will increase administrative costs and
create inferior incentives;

(3)

superior incentives can be created while decreasing
administrative costs; and

(4)

administrative costs can be reduced at the price of
inferior incentives (pp 34-35).

As he says, (2) and (3) are easy cases, while (1) and (4) are the
hard ones, where there really is a trade-off. One might think that
Simple Rules for a Complex World would be about those cases,
cataloguing the ones in which administrative savings justify
imperfect incentives.
Instead, the book is mainly about "the tortured modern legal
situation," where "t]oo often we treat the second case as though
it were the first, and aim to create more complex legal structures
that in fact lead to inferior social outcomes, most typically by
strangling well functioning competitive markets for the provision
of goods and services" (p 35). In situation (2), however, the simplicity or complexity of the legal rule is not a moving part of the
argument. Government should not create inferior incentives even
if it can do so for free.2" Rational people would not take medicine that made them sicker even if it were being given away.
Epstein's examples of excessive regulation, which he characterizes as excessive complexity, mainly fall into category (2):
alterations of private incentives that the government never
should have undertaken, no matter what their administrative

2

It will sometimes make sense for government to create inferior incentives if the ad-

ministrative costs are negative-if the loss in incentives is less than the gain in reduced
administration-but that is case (4), not case (2).
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cost. In criticizing the antidiscrimination laws, Epstein describes
some of their complexities and then asks, "what is gained, if
anything, by the use of so formidable a legal structure to attack
the problem of discrimination? The answer is nothing, except
social unrest and economic dislocation" (p 175). You might think
that increased racial harmony is worth billions in administration,
but would you buy social unrest and economic dislocation for a
quarter?
To be sure, administrative costs do play an important role in
the arguments for the simple rules themselves. Private property
is generally better than collective property because of administrative costs, and strict liability is preferred to negligence for the
same reason. Even here, though, administrative cost enters as a
tie-breaker, not as the winner in a tradeoff with incentives. Epstein does not assert that collective ownership gives better incentives than does individual ownership, and his argument as to
liability rests on the premise that in an error-free world the two
regimes generate the same incentives.
It is possible, I think, to isolate the source of Epstein's error
with some precision, and useful to do so in part because the error
is invited by an influential definition of complexity that Epstein
takes over from another leading scholar, Peter Schuck." Schuck
identifies four axes along which legal rules move from simple to
complex: density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy.
Dense rules "are numerous and cover in minute detail all aspects
of a given transaction" (p 24). Technical rules require specialized
expertise in their application, differentiated rules draw on more
than one source of law, and indeterminate rules are as the name
implies. Epstein has a little more in mind; he adds that "the
minimum condition for calling any rule complex is that it creates
public regulatory obstacles to the achievement of some private
objective" (p 27).
This last proviso seems to be a gloss on density and a source
of confusion. Suppose the law provides that people about to cross
the street must meet thirty requirements. This should be a fairly
dense rule by Schuck's definition, and hence more complex than
the same rule minus ten of the requirements. Now suppose that
almost everyone, when crossing the street, would meet all thirty
requirements even if there were no law imposing them; such
requirements include rules such as "do not crawl across the

' See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
Duke L J 1, 3 (1992).
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street" rather than "hop across the street on one foot." They are
no less dense and complex for being so easy to comply with. Understanding each requirement and ensuring that you are in compliance might take quite a while, even if the answer in all thirty
cases turns out to be yes-how many people realize, without
thinking about it, how they shift their weight when stepping off a
curb? The street crosser who would have complied with all thirty
requirements anyway has encountered substantial administrative
costs, and nothing but administrative costs, because of this rule.
If I understand Epstein correctly, he regards the rule requiring people to hop as more complex than the one forbidding them
from crawling. It is true that the cost of compliance with the
former is higher, but that is not an administrative cost and it is
not, by any ordinary understanding, an aspect of complexity. Two
rules are of equal complexity according to ordinary language if
they require that the same amount of information be gathered
and the same amount of information processing take place. To be
more onerous is not to be more complex. That is another axis
altogether.
Schuck's dimension of density invites this error because the
natural examples of dense rules are also quite intrusive. People
who complain about micromanagement are usually concerned
with being told to do things they do not want to do; the problem
of wasting time discovering that what they wanted to do anyway
is consistent with the rule is secondary. As anyone who has ever
dealt with a bureaucracy (let alone any bureaucrat) knows, being
harassed and being thwarted are not the same.
This is not simply a matter of nomenclature and clarity of
exposition because it can matter whether the real issue has to do
with administrative costs or something more basic. If the problem with the regulatory state is that administering it is expensive, then improvements in information technology will make
government more attractive. If the problem with welfare is
waste, fraud, and abuse, then management improvements can
make welfare desirable. This is hardly what Richard Epstein has
in mind, however. Indeed, one would expect him to mourn every
step forward in the technology of intrusive government, because
those improvements make state interference cheaper and will
cause more of it to be demanded. For Epstein, as for any
Hayekian, misallocation by government is the dog and administration is its tail.
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B. Regulation and Complexity
Epstein, following Schuck, makes indeterminacy an aspect of
complexity (p 25). I think this is a questionable move that obscures an important point, one Epstein would be happy to make.
It is easy enough for lawyers to consider indeterminacy an aspect
of complexity because we have been stuffed to the gills with
multifactor tests that are highly uncertain in their application,
just as we have read acres of pages of complicated argument that
lead to no clear conclusion. Nevertheless, simplicity and clarity
are not the same thing. A rule can be clear without being simple.
The process by which OS/2 Warp Connect and WordPerfect are
putting my words on the screen as I write this Review is vastly
complicated, far beyond my powers of comprehension. It is also
highly determinate: if one hundred Harrisons hit the same keystrokes on one hundred machines of this make and model with
the same software loaded we will all get the same results except
in very unusual circumstances. 9 My word processor is immensely complex (at least from the standpoint of my poor computational abilities) and very determinate.
A rule can be complicated yet certain. It is also possible for a
provision of law to be simple, at least as that word is ordinarily
used, and at the same time quite indeterminate. This latter claim
will be more controversial, but consider the common distinction
between rules and standards. The hallmark of a rule is clarity in
application. ° A standard, by contrast, is "a legal direction which
can be applied only by making, in addition to a finding of what
happened or is happening in the particular situation, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable
consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general human experience."3 ' Hart and Sacks give a speed limit as an ex-

Eventually we might come up with Hamlet, but that is another story.

30 As Hart and Sacks observe:

The most precise form of authoritative general direction may conveniently be called a
rule, although this term is often used much more broadly to signify a legal proposition of any kind. In the narrow and technical sense in which the term is here used, a
rule may be defined as a legal direction which requires for its application nothing
more than a determination of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental
events-that is, determinations of fact.
Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 139 (cited in note 5).
31

Id at 140.
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ample of a rule, a requirement that drivers proceed at a reasonable speed as an example of a standard. 2
It is tempting to think that standards must be rather complex on Epstein's reckoning, even if his criteria are stripped of
the factor of determinacy. Surely standards require the acquisition and processing of large amounts of information, requiring
substantial computational effort for their application and thereby
generating large administrative costs. Richard Epstein of all
people, however, should not say that. As a good Hayekian he
knows that all the time people make decisions that seem to reflect enormous amounts of information and processing but nevertheless make them easily and quickly. Take a legal example, one
of the favorite instances of a standard: the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. It does not take most people very long to
decide whether a punishment is cruel. Ordinary concepts are
routinely applied with low transaction costs even though it is
impossible to specify what is going on when any single individual
does so, and even though there is a substantial degree of disagreement among individuals as to their proper applications.
The match between indeterminacy and complexity is also
imperfect if we judge complexity by Schuck's more detailed criteria (except indeterminacy, of course-no victory by definition
allowed). While some people might consider a large number of
factors in determining whether a punishment is cruel, very few
would employ the kind of grid of mandatory factors that would
make the concept dense in Schuck's sense. Nor need a concept be
technical to be indeterminate; indeed, many technical concepts,
including many legal concepts, are created in order to avoid the
indeterminacy of ordinary language. Differentiation accompanies
technicality and density but often does not plague legal standards, which tend to be cast in ordinary language. Standards can
be simple and rules can be complex, except that standards are
indeterminate and rules less so.
Why would anyone ever go to the trouble of formulating a
dense, technical, differentiated set of rules to replace a simple
standard? Sometimes certainty and clarity are worth purchasing
with the coin of simplicity. This is likely to be true if the rule
maker is trying to control the conduct of a rule applier who, in a
particular situation, does not know quite what the rule maker
would require and, in any event, may have little interest in doing
it. The rule maker and rule applier may be a principal and a
3' Id at 139-40.
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marginally competent, doubtfully faithful, agent. Or they may be
a government agency and a private person.
The need for determinacy is clear enough when the private
person does not know what the agency wants. This is likely to
happen fairly often, because private people mainly know what
they want. Sanctioning people for breaking rules they do not
understand may lead to nervous breakdowns, or cause people to
abandon activities altogether, but will lead people to conduct the
activity in compliance with the rules only by accident. Even when
regulated parties do know in their hearts of hearts what the
government would like them to do, it may be difficult to obtain
compliance through a standard. In an enforcement proceeding
the agency will have to expend resources persuading the adjudicator of the standard's proper application and the private
person's knowledge thereof. This process can be expensive and
uncertain, and sophisticated targets of regulation are likely to be
aware of this and game the system as much as they can.
Is this to say that all regulation is command-and-control and
that agencies never employ standards rather than rules? It is
not, but there is something to learn by examining the situations
in which standards are more common. Licensing is one of them.
Agencies with licensing authority are notoriously disinclined to
adopt rules that would constrain their discretion. The difference
between licensing and other forms of regulation is that the regulated parties normally are not permitted to act without a license.
If they do so they can be punished, not for violating the standard
that governs the licensing decision, but simply for violating the
license requirement.
Licensing puts the agency in charge of a bottleneck at which
it is able to exercise discretion and avoid reducing its standard to
a rule. Suppose that all the decisions of a business were subject
to regulatory approval before they were put into effect, rather
than being subject to after-the-fact sanctions if they violate some
rule. This could still be called regulation, but it could also be
called public ownership. It is like having a government agency as
a board of directors. A board of directors can use rules and standards as it thinks best. It can broadly delegate to trustworthy
subordinates and give precise rules to subordinates who need
more guidance, while requiring that certain decisions be referred
to the board for discretionary decision.
Private ownership of the means of production, however, implies that as a general matter a government agency will not be in
the position of the board of directors. As Epstein explains, there
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are reasons not to give government that kind of discretionary
control over the economy (p xii). But if discretion is limited, if
government's ability to regulate through standards is curtailed
by the structure of ownership, then regulation will be pushed in
the direction of rules-complex and difficult to administer, but
designed to be precise in order to constrain the discretion of regulated people and facilitate enforcement. Regulation without public ownership frequently entails the kind of complexity that aims
at precision and determinacy.
From Epstein's standpoint, the moral is that half measures
do not work. If the economy is to be controlled through regulation
rather than management there will be high administrative costs
from complexity. His solution is to have the economy not controlled at all. The more powerful his arguments about the administrative costs of regulation, the more the debate over public
ownership is the whole ball of wax. The intermediate position is
too administratively costly to be worth the trouble.

III. BONHAM RICHARD OR JEREMY EPSTEIN
Richard Epstein may or may not have a Napoleonic complex,
but he is at least a Benthamite. This book strongly implies that
he favors a code, a comprehensive statement of the private law
sufficiently detailed that an ordinary person could use it to answer the vast bulk of legal questions. All those ordinary persons,
of course, would come to the same conclusion. It is Jeremy
Bentham's dream.33 Simple Rules for a Complex World does not
include the code, which is to say that its title is misleading. Epstein does not offer rules; rather, as he sometimes recognizes, he
offers basic principles that are to guide the construction of the
law (pp 16-17). Freedom of contract is a principle, not a law of
contract; private property in land is a principle, not a system of
tenures, estates, and registration.
A code there must be, however, or Epstein's preaching is
vain and our faith is also vain. The point of this exercise is simplicity, as represented centrally by the reduction in the need for
lawyers. Epstein does not suggest that if his proposals are adopted people will do less; if anything they will do more once their
productive powers are unleashed. That means that they will be

' See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on
Government 93 (Athlone 1977) (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds) ("Is it not to be wished
that a man could know for certain, the legal consequences of his doing an act before he
does it?").
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able to do all those things, and be confident that what they are
doing is lawful, without advice of counsel. Simplicity is nothing if
it is not that. Moreover, Epstein stresses the determinacy of his
approach, and agrees that indeterminacy is an aspect of complexity, the original sin in his system (p 25). This means that it must
be possible to write down the answers. And that, as I suggested,
is the Benthamite paradise of codification: every citizen to have a
short book, suitable for memorization, that contains almost everything everyone will need to know about ordinary life, and
another book or so that deals with specialized questions one
might encounter as butcher, baker, or software maker.
Epstein should have no regrets about being called a philosophical radical, although it is another question whether he
would admit to Frenchifying. My first point with this observation
is that he has done something that legal scholars are rarely rash
enough to do: he has made a testable assertion and may now legitimately be called on to stand and deliver. Epstein apparently
means to say that he could write a highly comprehensible and
determinate code. This can be checked. For example, we could
take the code and ask a large group of people just admitted to
law school, but otherwise uncorrupted, to resolve a large number
of cases that could easily arise in everyday life. Or we could take
a smaller number of law professors and ask them to formulate
hypotheticals that have no easy answer. The less lifelike and
natural the hypotheticals turn out to be, the better the code is
working.
Second, Epstein is assuming that the concepts used by his
private law have very little open texture-they have fairly clear
application to situations that could not have arisen at the time
the concepts were formulated.34 Otherwise the code would not
have determinacy. Epstein's discussion of social change confirms
that he thinks there is very little open texture (pp 327-31). His
response to the objection that the simple rules do not adapt to
change, especially new technologies, is that the takings principle
solves the problem. The legislature may accommodate new developments by altering the simple rules, as by creating new proper-

'

See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 119-20 (Clarendon 1961):

[In the case of everything which we are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are
reasons for both asserting and denying that it applies.... This imparts to all rules a
fringe of vagueness or "open texture."
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ty like copyright and patents, provided the alteration makes
everyone better off. He gives overflights by airplanes as an example (p 329). Under previous common law rules of property, flying
over land owned by another was trespass and forbidden. An exercise of the eminent domain power that allows everyone to fly
freely makes everyone, or just about everyone, better off. He
makes a similar argument with respect to broadcasting, where he
favors changing the law to permit what would otherwise be a
trespass-transmission of electromagnetic signals over people's
property (p 330)."
When you think about it this is quite a claim. Epstein does
not say that the simple rules provide no answer to the question
of overflight or broadcasting. He says that there is an answer,
albeit a suboptimal one. The suggestion that the answers really
were there all along is plausible with respect to overflights, although somewhat of a stretch. As to broadcasting, it strikes me
as very strange to say that Blackstone's concept of property is
being applied, not changed, after the discovery of radio.
Epstein, however, does not give up; he says the answer was
there all along. Which means that in an important respect he is
throwing over the common law process. That is not necessarily a
bad thing, but it is an unusual step for a Hayekian or Coasean to
take. The more determinate and the less open-textured Epstein's
code is, the less it calls for and admits of adaptation to new circumstances by judges. Consider radio again. According to Epstein
the common law was clear: broadcasting, like overflight, was
trespass (p 330).3" According to Coase, when Congress adopted
the Federal Radio Act of 1927 it interrupted the courts in the
process of sorting out ownership of the spectrum through the use
of common law judicial analogies.37 If Epstein is right, then the
courts were going about it all wrong.3 8 They should have de' For more detail on the story of broadcasting, see Richard A.- Epstein, No New
Property, 56 Brooklyn L Rev 747, 756-58 (1990).
Id at 757.
Coase, 2 J L & Econ at 30-31 (cited in note 19).
It is a mistake to think that a court could solve this problem by applying the principle of first possession to the radio spectrum and recognizing squatters' rights in those
who had begun to broadcast-rights determined by the time, frequency, location, and
power of their broadcasts. Such an approach would not be an application of the principle
of first possession because the radio spectrum is not a thing that can be occupied. Even if
the luminiferous ether is a thing (and thus Michelson and Morley and Kennedy and
Thorndike and Lorentz and Fitzgerald and Einstein lived in vain), the spectrum is not a
thing, it is a metaphor. To recognize squatters' rights would be to apply a metaphorical
extension of the principle of first possession, not the principle itself. Metaphorical extension is the primary way in which open-textured concepts grow, but Epstein's concepts are
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clared broadcasting a trespass and granted damages, perhaps
injunctions.
Epstein might seek to salvage the common law method of
adaptation by admitting that courts are changing the law when
they recognize new property. He would go on to say that of
course the courts are subject to the takings requirement when
they do so. He might, but I hope he would not. If anyone as skeptical of government power as Richard Epstein would allow the
same people to make the law and decide its constitutionality, the
ceiling should fall on him. No, the judges should uphold the existing system of rights until the legislature changes it with a new
rule that satisfies the takings criterion. As civilians say, the code
is complete.
Epstein's code, being a code, also would be an authoritative
verbal formulation of the law. My third observation is that this,
like the claim of completeness, puts Epstein in tension with other
Hayekian principles. Unlike a code, the common law has no canonical verbal formulation. 9 Judicial opinions expound and apply common law principles in specific cases but do not generate
any authoritative form of words. The deposit of a case, according
to the standard rules of precedent, is its holding. Holdings are no
more captured in forms of words than is the doctrine of consideration; later courts respect the precedential authority of a case by
following a holding that they may reformulate, even rejecting the
specific phrases of the earlier opinion.
Knowledge of the common law, that is to say, is tacit rather
than explicit. People know what is required of them, which is
what keeps the system from being one of merely arbitrary power,
but they cannot necessarily explain what they know. Judges can
decide cases in a way that largely ratifies people's expectations,
but the judges' attempts to express the rules are provisional. To
say that the common law can be codified is to say that this
knowledge is not incorrigibly tacit: what the participants and the
judges know and do can be captured in words. Those words will
both truly capture the practice and be so precise that someone
who knows the language, but does not possess the tacit knowledge directly, can nevertheless know what is expected and predict how courts will act.

not open textured.
' See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof
Statutes and the Constitution,37 Case W Res L Rev 179, 186-87 (1986).
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As Epstein recognizes, an enormous amount of what people
do involves highly specific and detailed knowledge that cannot
easily be expressed, and perhaps cannot be expressed at all (pp
43-44). He apparently means to claim, however, that at some
point in the development of human interaction there is a major
transition from rules that cannot be captured in words to rules
that can be. I do not mean to deny this. I do mean, however, to
point out that the issue is very important. Hayek himself was
deeply skeptical of the suggestion that the rules of ordinary interaction-the stuff of private law--could be reduced to verbal
formulae. He thought that knowledge of that sort remained
largely tacit, and that although it could be drawn out by the
common law process of commentary on practice, it could not be
drawn out in canonical form.40 Epstein's system, however, implies that the basic rules of interaction between strangers can be
captured in words. This pulls him into the question whether programs of codification like Bentham's can truly succeed. The next
iteration of Epstein's theory very much needs to address this
question, and, more broadly, the question of whether and to what
extent he really is a codifier. Bentham is alluring, and for the
heirs of the written constitution especially so, but he may or may
not have been right about private law.
IV. PUBLIC LAw, PRIVATE LAW, RULES, AND STANDARDS

A. The Supreme Court of the United States? Really?
This Section contains the easy criticism of Epstein's proposal
concerning constitutional law. With respect to public law, his
system is either crucially incomplete or deeply flawed. He has
given us a substantive rule, the takings principle. It requires that
government action that changes or goes beyond the simple rules
be nonredistributive (except certain forms of straightforward

"' Hayek maintained that the earliest rules of conduct were tacit rather than explicit,
rules that "existed only as a 'knowledge how' to act and not as a 'knowledge that' they
could be expressed in such and such terms." F.A_ Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and Liberty:
Rules and Order 76 (Chicago 1973). Addressing more mature legal systems, Hayek
thought the common law method superior because it preserved the ability to reason from
understandings that remain tacit rather than explicit. Common law judges, he said,
possess "a capacity for discovering general principles rarely acquired by a judge who
operates with a supposedly complete catalogue of applicable rules before him .... The
common law judge is bound to be very much aware that words are always but an imperfect expression of what his predecessors struggled to articulate." Id at 87.

1996]

Richard Epstein's Big Picture

redistribution toward the poor). He says little about institutional
design, and what he does say is a bad idea.
Application of the takings principle requires the resolution of
large, difficult, and controversial empirical questions. In assessing the constitutionality of any form of new property, for example, the institution applying the principle must decide whether
the proposed new property regime makes everyone better off,
despite the new restriction on common law liberty.4 The principle thus introduces a standard into the heart of the system of
simple rules. Standards are delegations to future decision makers. The application of standards varies with the identity of those
decision makers. Institutional arrangements that determine who
decides which questions thus matter enormously.
Epstein says very little about this, so the set of rules is incomplete. What he does say is very troubling. He seems to suggest that it would be a good idea to have application of the takings principle entrusted to an institution like our current federal
judiciary, headed by an institution like the Supreme Court of the
United States (see p 132).
If you're going to have a standard, a delegation, you really
need to have a faithful and competent agent. The Supreme
Court's track record as expositor of the Constitution is not very
impressive. We can consider that history from Epstein's standpoint. If you ask him, the Court gutted the Contracts Clause in
Ogden v Saunders." The Contracts Clause is the original
Constitution's most important limitation on the private-law activities of the state legislatures. In 1857 the Court used reasoning
much like Epstein's theory of the Takings Clause to come to the
conclusion that the Constitution imposed on the federal territories a rule of private law that violates the principle of autonomy.43 In 1873 the Court approved a slaughterhouse monopoly in
New Orleans, largely erasing the centerpiece of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment along the way." Even during the balmy

"' In Epstein's words, "[tihe takings principle allows for basic alterations in the system of property rights as long as these shifts promise substantial net benefits for society
at large" (p 328).
42 25 US (12 Wheat) 213 (1827). Epstein's thoughts on this issue are set
forth in
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U Chi L Rev 703, 729-30 (1984).
' See Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857) ("Dred Scott"). I am not trying to
associate Epstein with Dred Scott. Epstein puts autonomy first. He would say that the
Thirteenth Amendment is even more important than the Fifth, because the Thirteenth
establishes the regime of self-ownership. The Supreme Court, not Richard Epstein, must
answer for Dred Scott.
" See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
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days of the Lochner era the Court frequently upheld regulation.45 As for the Court's performance in the twentieth century,
the less said the better.
Now that we have stopped guffawing at the suggestion that
the Supreme Court has been a faithful expositor of Richard
Epstein's Constitution, or mine, or any reader's, or any Constitution but its own, we can turn to more theoretical considerations.
Justices are lawyers chosen by politicians, not the voters, and
they serve for life. Especially in post-Realist America, nothing in
that description suggests that Justices will be more likely than
legislatures to apply faithfully the standards contained in the
Constitution.4 6
To be sure, there is a plausible argument that the Court will
vindicate widely shared policy views against wayward local measures and momentary gusts of public opinion. The Court's national character and its insulation from elections make that quite
possible. But there is no reason in theory to believe, and no reason from history to conclude, that when the applicable constitutional provision is as standard-like as Epstein's takings principle
the Justices will follow it honestly. Those widely shared policy
views that Justices are likely to vindicate need have nothing to
do with the Constitution.
Measured against the possible gains from judicial power are
its costs. A non-Epsteinian judiciary ostensibly enforcing the
takings principle could do wonderful favors for its preferred interest groups. Suppose that Congress adopts a new copyright law
and thereby puts out of business people who had been copying
and distributing others' works. Congress determines that these
copiers read very little and never produce original material, so
they are made worse off by the new law. Congress decides to give
them in-kind compensation by exempting them from the new law
for five years. Holders of new copyrights nevertheless sue the
grandfathered copiers for infringement. They argue that the

Years 1789-1888 342-51 (Chicago 1985), discussing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16
Wall) 36 (1873).
4' See, for example, Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366 (1898).
4 This discussion is not normative constitutional law in the ordinary sense. It does
not seek to tell judges what they ought to do, on the assumption that they have power. As
a normative matter my arguments operate at the level of constitutional design, where the
question is not what courts should do with their power but whether they ought to have it.
My normative claim is that it is a bad idea to entrust the enforcement of constitutional
standards to judicial review as it is known today in America. I should also note that the
wisdom of enforcing constitutional rules through judicial review is another question
entirely.
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copiers really do receive sufficient in-kind compensation without
the exemption-maybe they secretly devour new literature-and
that the exemption is really a politically motivated transfer of
their property to the copiers. The Justices decide who their
friends are and answer the empirical questions accordingly.
The charitable reading of Epstein on this point is that he has
simply neglected it. His statements about what courts should do
can easily be read as ordinary normative recommendations within the current political structure rather than recommendations as
to what that structure should be. If he means to be addressing
the latter issue he needs to rethink the matter completely.
B. Really Simple Rules
Here are some basic facts about social cooperation. Most of
the goals toward which people cooperate are indeterminate in
that agreements as to ends do not entail agreements as to
means. All the hoplites in the Spartan army presumably want to
achieve victory in battle but it is very unlikely that they will
agree on how to do it. As a result, if each of them does what he
thinks he should do to win the battle they are very likely to lose:
battles are won by armies, not mobs, and the .difference between
an army and a mob is that the soldiers in an army are all following the same plan. Indeed, in the face of the enemy it is usually
better to be in a poorly commanded army than in an armed mob.
In such situations it is more important to do the same thing than
the best thing.
Where people need to coordinate but have no rule clear
enough to enable them to do so on their own, the best thing for
each individual may be to follow the rule that provides, "Do what
the commander says." The commander, if honest, will not be
following any rule. He will be following a standard, one that
says, "Win the battle." But commanders are as frail and human
as their followers and often will use the indeterminacy built into
the standards they apply to their own advantage. For all most
people knew it was an accident that David placed Uriah the
Hittite on the front line. Power is what one has when others
follow a rule of doing what the power holder says rather than the
standard of doing what the followers themselves think best. So
here's the surprise: power is dangerous.
One response to this problem is to adopt a slightly more
complicated rule than simply doing what the commander says.
Consider this rule: "Every year the army elects the commander."
This is a little trickier. The soldiers have to know one another (to
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know who the army is), they have to have a method of election,
and they all have to have the same calendar. If those requirements are met, however, annual election has real virtues. It has
not only the obvious virtues that it makes commanders more
accountable during their year in office, and makes it easier to get
rid of a bad one, but the even more important virtue that it is
likely to work. First, the soldiers can apply the rule themselves,
without conferring power on anyone else. If the soldiers need
priests to tell them when a year is up, or censors to tell them
who is really in the army, or election officials to tell them who
won the vote, they have the problem of power all over again.
Second, the rule in a sense applies itself. If an ousted commander
continues to give orders after the election, no one is likely to listen, if only because no one has much reason to expect that anyone else will listen--everyone knows who the new commander is,
and there is not much point in being a general's only soldier.
Constitutional design thus involves the well known contrast
between rules and standards in a different context. It is common
to see a standard as a means of delegating authority to later
decision makers, so that standards are chosen when such delegation is desirable. Standards may be chosen for other reasons, the
most important of which is that sometimes a rule just won't do
the job. So far no one knows the rules for winning the battle or
making sound public policy. In these situations, delegation to
future decision makers is not so much the point of the exercise as
a side effect resulting from the need to use a standard. If there is
agency slippage between the delegators and the delegates-if the
delegates may abuse the power that comes with authoritative
application of a standard-then there is a problem from the
standpoint of the principals. If we think of the people being governed as the principals and the officers of state as the agents,
this is the problem of government.
It is common to say that rules are chosen to avoid delegation.
For at least a few rules, however, their rule-like character-the
fact that a great many people will be able to apply them independently and get the same answer-is necessary to their function.
In my military example, the rule that tells who the commander is
can function only if it is a rule; people must know for themselves
whom to follow. On such questions, where delegation is impossible, only a rule will do.
The leading example I am using of a rule that has to be a
rule in order to work is the one that tells the followers who the
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authoritative appliers of standards are.4 7 Another important feature of such rules is that they are especially likely actually to be
followed, and not replaced with another rule, because it is so
difficult to organize departures from them: because people will
follow such a rule only if they know that other people will do so,
changing one is just as difficult as organizing one in the first
place. Rules like this do not involve the normal dangers of delegation because they do not involve any delegation. In figuring out
whom to follow the followers consult no one but themselves.
It may be that different rules concerning the identity of the
leaders have different consequences for the leaders' fidelity to the
interests of their followers-that some create better incentives for
agents than others. Happy the country whose leaders are identified by rules that create such incentives, provided of course that
the rules are capable of consistent but independent application
by a great many people. But to satisfy that condition a rule must
be very, very rule-like. It must be very clear and not very complicated. Richard Epstein's great master Thomas Hobbes proposed
such a simple rule: absolute power vested in a single man or a
single assembly of men.
Autonomy and first possession, to use two examples, hardly
qualify as simple rules by this standard. They may be clear compared to current "constitutional law"--the doctrines of the Supreme Court-but they are quicksand compared to this: Two
Senators from each State. There is a truly simple rule.
The contrast between Epstein's proposal and rules that are
clear enough to cut out delegation to authoritative rule-appliers
suggests three observations. First, this distinction gives us some
purchase on one of the fundamental, if neglected, questions in
American constitutional theory. It is a question Epstein's book
raises implicitly: What is the relation between public and private
law in the American constitutional scheme? In particular, why do
constitutions in this country consist almost entirely of public
law-rules about institutions of government, rather than rules,
like Epstein's, that govern the relations between people? Why
deal with Leviathan, king of the children of pride, rather than
the children themselves?

"' The reader should not be misled by the military form of the story I tell. These issues are not limited to situations in which people must cooperate extensively in order to
achieve a fairly clear, shared goal. The authoritative standard-appliers can also be judges
deciding disputed questions of private law. They too might misuse the power that comes
with authoritatively applying a standard, and they too must be identified by a rule that
itself can be applied independently, without an authoritative interpreter.
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This is an important question. On one hand it is true even
today, and was overwhelmingly true when the federal Constitution was adopted and the pattern for state constitutions laid
down at the end of the eighteenth century, that America is not a
state-centered country. The public sector-the resources actively
controlled by institutions of government-was tiny in 1790. More
to the point, the central role of government in America has always been the preservation of private rights.
On the other hand, American constitutions contain almost no
private law, no rules for the conduct of ordinary individuals with
respect to other ordinary individuals. Moreover, even if Epstein
were correct in his strongest claims for the Contracts Clause and
the takings principle of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal
Constitution still would not itself supply rules to govern the relations of private people. Rather, it would severely limit the extent
to which the states could change the private law. The Contracts
Clause forbids the states from making laws that impair the obligation of contracts; it does not itself create or even regulate contracts or their obligation. Similarly, the takings principle deals
with changes in legal relations, because it deals with government
actions that take property; but one cannot take what was never
possessed.'
The contrast between the rule of first possession and the rule
of two senators from each state helps answer this question. It
points out what might be called the extremely limited "carrying
capacity" of constitutions. The less clear and more complicated
the constitutional rules become, the harder it is for the principals-the people-to enforce them directly. Instead, the constitutional rules turn into standards, and therefore into delegations to
authoritative interpreters. The rules' utility from the point of
view of the people declines as that happens. I do not mean to say
that the rules' effectiveness goes to zero, but it does decrease, as
my one-paragraph survey of American constitutional history
indicates. As that happens, it quickly becomes doubtful whether
the cost of constitutionalizing the rules (actually standards or
principles at this point) is worth the benefit. If the attempt to
write the private law into the Constitution would deteriorate into

The suggestion that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is a source of private
law is worth only a footnote. It is a limitation on the federal government, a government
with only secondary authority over the duties and entitlements of ordinary life such as
property and contract.
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a regime of judge-made private law with no legislative oversight,
then the project almost certainly should be abandoned.
At least, it should be abandoned unless we can devise some
better way of picking judges, a way that will find those few virtuous souls who can resist the temptations of power. This leads to
the second observation that comes from contrasting private law
with the structural provisions of constitutions: if government
action involves the exercise of discretion, including discretion
that seems to be unavoidable in the application of standards,
then the selection of the decision makers and their incentives in
office are central to constitutional design. It is no accident that
the Federal Convention was obsessed with the selection, tenure,
and structural role of officers and institutions. The convention
gave relatively little thought to constitutional limitations on
those officials' power and almost none to the relations between
private people. Hayek, Coase, and Epstein have an enormous
amount to say about the latter. Without the best possible version
of the Framers' new science of politics, however, it will not be
possible to design institutions that will most reliably translate
their prescriptions into the actual practice of government.
In saying most reliably I do not necessarily mean to be saying much, which leads to the third observation. If I may be permitted an Epstein-like generalization from history, it seems likely that institutions of government matter but that they are hardly decisive. Judicial review, one of the favorite obsessions of
American legal academics, is like that: it is important only at the
margins. In a country without any institutions for the use of
force that are independent of the great mass of the people, what
those people want is likely to be decisive.
Which means, in turn, that Epstein's program in this book is
of enormous importance, probably of more importance than even
the science of government. Statism begins in the minds of the
people, and it is there that the defenses of private property and
free contract must be constructed.4 9 The surest protection, the
only real protection, of property and contract is a widely shared
conviction that they are in the permanent interests of the vast
bulk of individuals. That such a conviction would be correct is the
heart of Epstein's thesis. For him the spread of that conviction,

"' Compare the UNESCO Constitution, Preamble, in Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, The
Encyclopedia of The United Nations and InternationalAgreements 827 (Taylor & Francis
1985) ("[S]ince wars began in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defences of peace must be constructed.").
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especially among intellectuals, would be worth a wilderness of
Takings Clauses.
CONCLUSION

If Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy was right, persuading the intellectuals is not going to be easy." Epstein makes
Hayekian arguments against the tendency that Schumpeter identified. I for one hope that the latter's predictions continue to be
largely falsified. Still, whatever Schumpeter's merits as a
prophet, one must give him points for style. He said that his
ambition had been to be the greatest economist in the world, the
greatest lover in Austria, and the greatest horseman in Vienna,
but that he had never been that much of a horseman."' In Simple Rules for a Complex World, Richard Epstein is a great common lawyer and a great big-picture artist, whether you like his
big picture or not, but he needs an editor. Two out of three was
good enough for Schumpeter.

o See Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy at 145-55 (cited in note 1).
51 This line of Schumpeter's exists in different versions, which suggests that he deliv-

ered it in different forms over the years. Variants are found in James Tobin, Foreword, in
Eduard Mdrz, Joseph Schumpeter: Scholar, Teacher, and Politician vii (Yale 1991), and
George J. Stigler, Memoirs of an UnregulatedEconomist 100 (Basic Books 1988).

